

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

MAURICE JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:07CV50  
Criminal Action No. 3:02CR64-04  
(JUDGE BAILEY)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**THAT §2255 MOTION BE DENIED**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

On April 27, 2007, *pro se* petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

**II. FACTS**

**A. Conviction and Sentence**

On February 25, 2003, petitioner signed a plea agreement by which he agreed to plead guilty to Count 48, distribution of heroin, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). On March 17, 2003, the petitioner entered his plea of guilty in open court.

On July 30, 2003, the petitioner appeared before the Court for sentencing. After considering several factors, including the circumstances of both the crime and the defendant, and the sentencing objectives of punishment, the Court sentenced the petitioner to a term of 188 months imprisonment.

**B. Appeal**

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.

**C. Federal Habeas Corpus**

Petitioner contends that his counsel failed to file notice of appeal as requested to do so.

**D. Recommendation**

Based upon a review of the record, the undersigned recommends that the petitioner's §2255 motion be denied and dismissed from the docket as untimely.

**III. ANALYSIS**

In 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [“AEDPA”] was enacted, establishing a one-year limitation period within which to file any federal habeas corpus motion. 28 U.S.C. §2255.<sup>1</sup>

The limitation period shall run from the last of:

1. The date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
2. The date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
3. The date on which the right was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review<sup>2</sup>; or
4. The date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. §2255.

In his § 2255 motion, the petitioner maintains that his motion is timely under the AEDPA. In this regard, the petitioner is clearly wrong.

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<sup>1</sup>The AEDPA applies to those cases filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the AEDPA. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).

<sup>2</sup>The one-year statute of limitation period under this subsection runs from the date on which the Supreme Court initially recognized the right asserted, not from the date on which the right asserted was made retroactive. Dodd v. United States, \_\_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 125 S.Ct. 2478 (2005).

In most cases, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for filing a direct appeal expires. Aikens v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n. 1 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000). There are two recognized exceptions to this general rule, which apply when a federal prisoner seeks direct appellate review of his conviction or sentence. First, if, following the disposition of his direct appeal, a federal prisoner files a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, the conviction becomes final when the Supreme Court either denies certiorari or issues a decision on the merits. See Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1300 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001). Second, if the federal prisoner does not file a timely certiorari petition after disposition of his direct appeal, the conviction becomes final on the date on which the prisoner's time for filing such a petition expires, which is ninety days after entry of the judgment on direct appeal. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 532 (2003). Here neither exception applies because the petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his conviction.

For federal prisoners, the time for filing a direct appeal expires ten days after the written judgment of conviction is entered on the criminal docket. *See Fed. R.Ap. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(I), (6).* Therefore, the petitioner's conviction became final on August 16, 2003, the date his time for filing a direct appeal expired. Therefore, he had until August 16, 2004, to file his habeas corpus under AEDPA. Because the petitioner did not file his § 2255 motion until April 27, 2007, it is clearly time barred.

#### **IV. Recommendation**

Based upon a review of the record, the undersigned recommends that the petitioner's §2255 motion be denied and dismissed from the docket because the petitioner is time-barred from raising his claim since his petition was filed over one year after his conviction became final.

Within ten (10) days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation, any party may file with the Clerk of Court written objections identifying those portions of the recommendation to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. A copy of any objections shall also be submitted to the United States District Judge. Failure to timely file objections to this recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of this Court based upon such recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984).

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the *pro se* plaintiff and counsel of record, as applicable.

DATED: July 12, 2007

/s/ James E. Seibert \_\_\_\_\_  
JAMES E. SEIBERT  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE